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The East Asian Pivot: How the UK’s Triple-Play with China and Japan Redefines 2026 Trade

The UK’s renewed engagement with East Asia in 2026 is not a cosmetic pivot but a structural repositioning of its trade strategy, centred on a pragmatic reset with China and a security-anchored deepening with Japan. For Safari International’s clients operating between the UK, East Africa and Asia, this “triple‑play” changes how routes are planned, contracts are structured, risks are priced, and currencies are chosen for settlement.



1. The China “Reset”: Pragmatism Over Posturing


After nearly a decade of frostiness, London and Beijing have moved to reopen the economic taps, particularly in services. In January 2026, the UK and China launched a new Bilateral Services Partnership and agreed a joint feasibility study on a dedicated Trade in Services agreement, aimed at establishing legally binding rules for UK firms in sectors such as financial, legal, healthcare, education and digital services. This explicitly responds to business lobbying for clearer market access conditions and more predictable regulation, especially in professional and digital services where UK capabilities are globally competitive.[5][6][1]


Two men shake hands in a formal setting with UK and Chinese flags in the background. Both wear suits and appear cordial.
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and China's President Xi Jinping share a handshake, symbolizing a moment of diplomatic engagement between the two nations.


The pivot is reinforced by a symbolic but commercially meaningful easing of people and product flows. China has agreed to allow British citizens visa‑free entry for stays of up to 30 days, ending a long period of onerous documentation, biometrics and lead times for short‑term business travel. In parallel, Beijing has halved the import tariff on Scotch whisky from 10% to 5%, a move the UK government values at around £250 million in additional economic benefit over five years and which restores the rate that applied before tariffs were doubled in 2025.[7][8][9][10][11][12][13][1]


Taken together, these steps signal a shift from ideological distance to managed interdependence. The services-focused agenda reflects the reality that China’s imports of professional, financial and digital services are forecast to grow rapidly in the 2020s, and that the UK – the world’s second‑largest services exporter – wants to capture a larger share of this upside. Rather than chasing a broad, politically sensitive goods FTA, London is targeting rule‑making in niches where its firms enjoy strong comparative advantage and where barriers are often regulatory, not tariff‑based.[1][5]


Services partnership vs goods FTAs


A bilateral services agreement differs fundamentally from a traditional goods‑heavy FTA. Goods agreements focus on tariffs, quotas, rules of origin and customs procedures; by contrast, a services accord prioritises:


  • Market access and national treatment commitments in sectors such as banking, insurance, legal, health, education and digital platforms.


  • Regulatory transparency, licensing procedures, data localisation, and professional qualifications recognition.


  • Disciplines on state-owned enterprises and competition conditions where they affect foreign service providers.


The UK–China feasibility study is designed to assess whether both sides are prepared to codify these rules in a way compatible with World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments, but more ambitious than existing General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) schedules. For Safari’s clients, that matters more than headline tariff reductions: it affects whether a UK logistics software firm can operate a local data hub, whether a legal consultancy can advise onshore, and how health providers can structure joint ventures in Chinese cities.[6][5]


Visa‑free access and execution speed


China’s unilateral decision to grant 30‑day visa‑free entry to British citizens is more than a convenience upgrade for tourists. For business actors:[8][9][7][1]


  • Deal cycles compress as executives can arrange due‑diligence visits and procurement missions within days, not weeks, without waiting for invitation letters or visa appointments.[8]


  • HR and travel policies simplify, lowering friction for SMEs that previously lacked the back‑office capacity to manage complex visa processes.[9][8]


  • Airline capacity is already responding, with carriers such as China Eastern increasing seats on UK–China routes, improving frequency and connectivity to interior logistics hubs.[8]


For East Africa–UK traders using China as a sourcing, trans-shipment or processing node, this accelerates on‑the‑ground negotiations with Chinese counterparties, particularly in packaging, light manufacturing and agri‑processing equipment. Safari’s clients can more easily dispatch mixed UK–East Africa teams to Chinese suppliers, negotiate quality standards and inspect facilities in person, tightening control of upstream risk.


Scotch tariffs and selective decoupling


The halving of tariffs on Scotch whisky illustrates an emerging pattern of “selective decoupling”. While the US has taken a more confrontational approach on technology export controls and investment screening, the UK is carving out space for sector‑specific market opening where strategic sensitivities are lower. China remains one of the fastest‑growing spirits markets globally, and with Scotch exports facing steep barriers in other large markets, the 5% rate in China enhances the UK’s competitive position.[10][11][12][13][14]


By prioritising an iconic but non‑strategic product such as whisky, London demonstrates that it can deliver tangible commercial wins while still aligning with allies on security‑sensitive technologies. For Safari’s agricultural and consumer‑goods clients, it is a reminder that tariff landscapes can shift quickly, both positively and negatively, and that diversified route planning (for example, serving Chinese demand via bonded zones or third‑country bottling) remains prudent.


How the UK stance compares to the EU and US


The UK’s approach sits somewhere between the EU’s “de‑risking” doctrine and the US’s partial “decoupling” strategy. EU leaders have repeatedly stated that Europe seeks to de‑risk, not decouple, from China, focusing on reducing strategic dependencies in critical raw materials, clean tech and digital infrastructure while maintaining trade volumes in less sensitive sectors. This has produced a dense toolbox of defensive instruments, from screening of Chinese FDI to export controls on advanced equipment, but also continued engagement via high‑level economic dialogues.[15][16]


The United States, by contrast, has imposed far-reaching export controls on semiconductors and related tools, strengthened outbound investment screening and encouraged “friend‑shoring” of supply chains away from China in key sectors. While not a full decoupling, the American approach places security and technology dominance ahead of trade expansion.


London’s reset is more explicitly commercial. By focusing on services, targeted tariff relief, and mobility for professionals, the UK is attempting to reclaim ground lost during the previous “ice age” in relations, while preserving the option to align with partners on sanctions and export controls where necessary. For African and UK clients, this means that China is unlikely to disappear from UK supply chains; instead, it will be managed through a more granular, sector‑specific risk lens.[11][8]




2. The Japan Partnership: Security Meets Supply Chain


If China is the arena for pragmatic re‑engagement, Japan is the anchor of the UK’s security‑aligned strategy in the Indo‑Pacific. Recent visits by the UK prime minister to Tokyo have yielded an expanded cyber strategic partnership and intensified cooperation on critical minerals, framed explicitly as a response to growing geopolitical and technological pressures in the region.[2][17]


Tokyo and London already have a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and are both members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans‑Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), with the UK becoming the first new economy to accede to CPTPP since its entry into force. What is emerging now is a deeper industrial, digital and security overlay on top of that legal architecture.[18][19]


Critical minerals and rare‑earth risk


Japan’s long experience managing resource insecurity – from energy to rare earths – makes it a natural partner for the UK’s diversification push. The two governments have agreed to accelerate cooperation on critical minerals supply chains, motivated by concerns over export restrictions and market concentration in a small number of supplier countries. Rare earth elements and other critical minerals underpin everything from EV batteries and wind turbines to semiconductors and defence systems; disruptions carry immediate economic and security costs.[17][2]


For Safari’s clients, especially those handling metals, batteries or green‑tech components, this has several implications:


  • New financing and offtake structures may emerge linking UK and Japanese investors to diversified extraction projects in Africa, including East Africa, as part of “trusted partner” supply chains.


  • Standards on traceability, ESG compliance and export controls are likely to become more stringent as critical minerals are securitised in both countries’ policy frameworks.[2]


  • Logistics providers will need to handle more complex routing and documentation for minerals moving through processing hubs in Japan or other CPTPP markets, before onward shipment to the UK.


Cyber partnership and digital trade


The newly announced cyber strategic partnership aims to enhance both countries’ resilience against cyber threats and protect critical infrastructure, including digital networks underpinning trade and logistics. As Japan upgrades its defence capabilities and deepens cooperation with Western allies, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in supply chains and digital platforms have become a major concern.[17][2]


From a trade perspective, this partnership will likely shape:


  • Standards for secure data exchange between UK and Japanese logistics platforms, ports and customs systems.


  • Requirements for cyber‑risk management among service providers operating in both markets, including cloud providers and digital marketplaces.

  • The design of “digital trade corridors” that link customs, port authorities, freight forwarders and banks through interoperable, secure systems.


SMEs working with Safari on cross‑border e‑commerce or digital trade routes into East Asia will increasingly find that cybersecurity compliance is not optional; it becomes part of market access. The upside is that stronger digital trust frameworks can reduce fraud, documentation errors and payment disputes across long supply chains.


Industrial strategy: clean energy, manufacturing and green logistics


The UK–Japan Industrial Strategy Partnership is moving into implementation, with the first tranche of activity announced in 2025 focusing on clean energy sectors such as offshore wind and nuclear, tied to broader climate and energy security goals. A landmark £7.5 billion investment agreement with Japan’s Sumitomo Corporation, to be deployed into UK clean energy and infrastructure projects including offshore wind and hydrogen, underscores the scale of Japanese capital committed to the UK’s industrial and energy transition.[20][21][22][23]


This industrial cooperation has knock‑on effects for logistics and trade:


  • Green logistics corridors will need to support offshore wind component flows, hydrogen infrastructure, and related heavy equipment between UK ports and Asian manufacturing bases.


  • UK and Japanese firms will co‑develop standards for low‑emission shipping, port electrification and alternative fuels, influencing the operating environment for carriers and freight forwarders in the wider Indo‑Pacific.


  • East African producers participating in clean‑energy value chains (for example, supplying inputs to battery or hydrogen technologies) may plug into Japan–UK projects as ancillary suppliers, provided they can meet technical and ESG requirements.


Placed within the broader Indo‑Pacific strategy, this deepening ties the UK more firmly into a network of US, Japanese, Australian and other partners seeking to uphold open sea lanes, interoperable standards and diversified production, with CPTPP providing the legal backbone for tariff preferences and common disciplines on issues such as intellectual property and data flows.[19][18]




3. Strategic Balancing: Diversification Without Dependency


The combination of a services‑heavy reset with China and a security‑industrial deepening with Japan reflects an emerging UK doctrine of “multi‑alignment” or “Plus One” trade strategy. Rather than yoking itself to a single hegemon or bloc, London is attempting to build overlapping partnerships that reduce over‑reliance on any one market, while still benefiting from scale.


Engaging China without over‑reliance


The UK’s services initiative and visa liberalisation with China aim to rebuild economic links in areas where British companies are strong, but which can be relatively insulated from potential future sanctions or export controls. A Trade in Services agreement, if eventually negotiated, would still sit within WTO disciplines and could be structured to allow for carve‑outs in security‑critical sectors.[5][1][8]


At the same time, continued cooperation on offshore renminbi (RMB) markets and cross‑border settlement through London strengthens the UK’s role as a global hub for Chinese currency use, while spreading risk across multiple financial centres. London has a longstanding RMB–sterling swap line with the People’s Bank of China, and by 2024 cross‑border RMB transactions between China and the UK reached approximately RMB 3.7 trillion, with RMB 304 billion used for goods trade, around 43.4% of bilateral trade value. This allows UK firms to price some trade in RMB while maintaining access to deep sterling and dollar liquidity.[24][25]


Deepening with Japan without acting as a proxy


The relationship with Japan is explicitly framed around shared security concerns and economic resilience, but London is careful to present itself as an autonomous actor, not simply an extension of US Indo‑Pacific strategy. Cooperation on critical minerals, cyber and industrial policy is achieved through bilateral frameworks and multilateral vehicles like CPTPP, in which Japan plays a leading role.[18][19][2][17]


For Safari’s clients, this means that UK alignment with Japan on issues such as export controls, supply chain security or critical technology standards may not always be identical to US positions. There may be scope, for example, to route certain high‑tech components via Japanese or UK channels where American restrictions would be tighter, though such opportunities must be assessed carefully against evolving sanctions regimes.


De‑risking vs decoupling: lessons from Davos


The language of “de‑risking, not decoupling” popularised in EU and Davos discussions has migrated into UK policy as well. De‑risking aims to:[16][15]


  • Diversify suppliers and markets for critical inputs, reducing single‑country dependence.

  • Build redundancy and resilience in logistics and financing channels.

  • Deploy targeted defensive tools (FDI screening, export controls) without dismantling broad trade ties.


The UK’s East Asian pivot is a practical example of this philosophy. By investing in both Chinese and Japanese relationships, and by leveraging CPTPP membership for broader regional access, London is trying to construct a portfolio of partnerships that can absorb shocks, whether geopolitical, financial or technological, without forcing a binary choice between Washington and Beijing.


Currency settlement and regional baskets


The offshore RMB market in London and the UK’s role in global foreign‑exchange trading give British and African firms access to a broader menu of settlement options. With RMB accounting for a growing share of bilateral trade settlement with China and London holding more than 40% of global offshore RMB FX spot transactions, companies can mix and match currencies, for example, paying Chinese suppliers in RMB, invoicing UK clients in sterling and hedging exposures via London’s deep derivatives markets.[25][24]


At the same time, yen‑denominated financing linked to Japanese investment projects (for example, clean‑energy or infrastructure deals backed by Japanese capital) introduces the possibility of multi‑currency regional baskets. For Safari’s clients, especially those moving commodities through Asia, this opens strategies such as:


  • Using RMB for China‑linked sourcing contracts, yen for Japan‑linked project finance, and dollars or euros for global benchmark pricing.


  • Structuring multi‑currency invoices and forwards that align with the underlying geography of supply chains.


The managerial challenge is to ensure treasury capabilities can handle the operational complexity of this diversification.


4. Operational Implications: Logistics, SMEs and Regulation


The East Asian pivot is not just about high‑level communiqués; it changes the operational environment for logistics providers, SMEs and multinationals connecting the UK, East Africa and Asia.


Global logistics networks: routing, compliance, insurance


Visa‑free access to China for British citizens, combined with expanding air capacity, will make it easier to coordinate multimodal routes that integrate Chinese ports, manufacturing centres and logistics parks into UK–Africa supply chains. For example, East African agricultural exports destined for UK retail may leverage Chinese cold‑chain facilities or packaging plants before final shipment, provided sanitary and phytosanitary standards can be maintained.[26][1][8]


However, increased reliance on East Asian hubs also heightens exposure to:


  • Export controls and sanctions tied to US‑China technology tensions, which can affect dual‑use goods, ICT equipment and high‑end machinery.


  • Maritime security risks in contested regional waters, which influence insurance premiums and routing decisions through the South and East China Seas.


  • Regulatory scrutiny of carbon intensity, where Japanese‑backed green logistics initiatives may offer advantages over higher‑emissions routes.


Safari’s clients will need route planning that reflects not only cost and time but also political, regulatory and ESG risk, often on a corridor‑by‑corridor basis.


SMEs vs multinationals in East Asia


For large multinationals, the new UK–China and UK–Japan frameworks mainly adjust marginal risks and opportunities; they already maintain in‑house compliance, legal and treasury teams. SMEs, however, often struggle to digest the complexity. Visa‑free access and clearer services rules lower some barriers to entry in China, making first‑time market exploration more realistic for mid‑sized firms in consulting, education, health tech or logistics software.[1][5][8]


Yet SMEs will face:


  • Dual compliance obligations if they operate in both China and Japan, for example, reconciling China’s data localisation and cybersecurity rules with Japan–UK cyber norms and potential restrictions on data flows to “untrusted” systems.[2][17]


  • Heightened expectations around ESG, labour and human‑rights due diligence when entering critical mineral or advanced manufacturing supply chains linked to Japanese investors.[22][20][2]


  • Currency and payment‑risk management requirements if they begin invoicing in RMB or yen.


This is where specialised trade facilitation partners such as Safari can provide value, aggregating legal, compliance and logistics expertise into practical market‑entry roadmaps.[3][4]


Regulatory fragmentation and dual‑compliance


Engaging both China and Japan simultaneously means navigating increasingly divergent regulatory regimes. In China, foreign service providers must contend with sector‑specific licensing, cybersecurity and data rules, and evolving local standards that can change with limited notice. In Japan and the broader G7 environment, security‑driven regulations prioritise transparency, interoperability and alignment with allied standards, especially for digital and critical‑infrastructure sectors.[6][5][17][2]


The result is dual‑compliance pressure:


  • A logistics platform serving both markets may need separate data architectures, with Chinese‑hosted systems satisfying domestic rules and Japanese/UK systems complying with more stringent cyber and data‑protection norms.


  • Exporters of high‑tech equipment must ensure they are not breaching Western export controls when shipping via Chinese ports, even if final markets are in Africa or the Middle East.


Firms that ignore these divergences risk fines, licence revocations or reputational damage; firms that manage them effectively can exploit arbitrage opportunities and deepen trust with regulators.


Digital trade corridors and cybersecurity


The cyber partnership between the UK and Japan, combined with the services focus in UK–China relations, underscores the centrality of digital trade corridors in the 2026 trade architecture. Paperless trade, e‑invoicing, digital bills of lading and AI‑driven risk‑scoring of shipments are moving from pilot projects to mainstream practice across major ports and logistics chains.[5][1][2]


For Safari’s clients, practical steps include:


  • Adopting platforms that can integrate with both Chinese and Japanese customs and port systems, using recognised data standards and security protocols.


  • Implementing robust cyber‑risk management, including incident response plans, multi‑factor authentication and encryption, as a prerequisite for participation in trusted trader schemes.


  • Leveraging digital tools to trace commodities, from East African coffee and horticulture to minerals, across complex, multi‑country supply chains, thereby meeting emerging traceability requirements from Japanese and European buyers.[20][2]


In this environment, digital competence becomes a core differentiator for exporters and logistics providers alike.


Medium‑term risks: controls, sanctions, reversals


Despite the current positive momentum, several medium‑term risks remain:


  • Export control escalation: Further US or allied controls on advanced chips, AI systems or quantum hardware could restrict the movement of dual‑use goods through Chinese territory, forcing re‑routing or reshoring of certain production stages.


  • Sanctions exposure: Any future deterioration in cross‑Strait or broader regional security could trigger sanctions affecting Chinese or Russian‑linked entities, complicating trade finance and insurance for shipments passing through affected ports.


  • Political reversals: Domestic politics in the UK, China or Japan could change the tone of engagement, especially if human‑rights concerns, security incidents or economic shocks prompt reevaluation of current strategies.


For Safari’s clients, scenario planning and contractual flexibility, including force majeure clauses tied to sanctions, diversified supplier bases, and modular logistics contracts – will be essential tools to manage these uncertainties.



5. What This Means for Safari International’s Clients


The East Asian pivot is already reshaping the operating landscape for Safari International’s network of partners and clients trading between the UK, East Africa and Asia. The key is to translate high‑level policy shifts into concrete decisions on routes, compliance, currency and execution.[4][3]


Route planning


  • Use China more surgically: Visa‑free access and services cooperation make China more attractive for specialised sourcing, value‑added processing and services delivery, but commodity‑heavy flows should still be diversified through alternative hubs (for example, Japan, Southeast Asia or Gulf ports) to mitigate geopolitical and regulatory risk.[26][1][5]


  • Integrate Japanese hubs into high‑value and sensitive chains: For critical minerals, advanced manufacturing inputs and clean‑tech equipment, Japanese ports and logistics zones may become preferred nodes, benefitting from stronger security, cyber standards and CPTPP market access.[19][18][20][2]


  • Build redundancy: Design supply chains with “Plan B” options – alternate routings that bypass specific chokepoints, and relationships with multiple logistics providers that understand both Chinese and Japanese regulatory environments.


Compliance strategy


  • Develop dual‑track compliance frameworks: Treat China and Japan as distinct regulatory ecosystems, with tailored policies on data management, cybersecurity, licensing and export controls, even when dealing with similar product lines.[6][17][2][5]


  • Embed ESG and traceability: Align operations with Japanese and UK expectations on environmental and social standards, especially for minerals, agricultural products and manufactured goods, leveraging digital traceability tools.[22][20][2]


  • Partner with specialised advisors: Use Safari and other expert intermediaries to interpret shifting rules, structure compliant contracts and avoid inadvertent breaches in complex multi‑jurisdictional chains.[3][4]


Currency exposure


  • Expand beyond a pure dollar‑sterling mindset: Consider RMB settlement for China‑linked sourcing and sales to reduce FX spreads and align payments with Chinese counterparties’ preferences, using London’s offshore RMB infrastructure and derivatives markets to hedge risk.[24][25]


  • Explore yen‑linked instruments: For projects tied to Japanese investment or CPTPP‑linked supply chains, yen financing and settlement may offer cost or risk advantages, particularly when aligned with long‑term infrastructure or clean‑energy contracts.[19][22]


  • Implement integrated treasury policies: SMEs in particular should formalise FX risk management policies, including forward contracts, natural hedging and regular exposure reviews across RMB, yen, sterling and dollars.


On‑the‑ground execution in East Asia


  • Deploy mixed teams: Leverage the ease of British travel to China to field joint UK–East Africa teams for negotiations, supplier audits and relationship building, while using Japanese hubs as platforms for high‑tech collaboration and joint ventures.[1][2][8]


  • Invest in digital and cyber readiness: Ensure systems can meet UK–Japan cyber standards and adapt to China’s digital rules, enabling participation in trusted trader programmes and digital trade corridors.[17][2]


  • Build long‑term local partnerships: In both China and Japan, local partners remain essential for regulatory navigation and market access; Safari’s network can help vet and structure these partnerships to align with clients’ risk appetites.[4][3]



Forward Look: The East Asian Pivot Beyond 2026


The UK’s triple‑play with China and Japan will not resolve all tensions in global trade, but it marks a significant evolution toward a more multi‑polar, multi‑aligned system. With China, the focus on services, mobility and targeted tariff relief suggests a managed interdependence that accepts strategic rivalry but seeks commercial stability where possible. With Japan, security, industrial policy and cyber cooperation create a template for trusted‑partner integration in critical sectors and clean‑energy transitions.[10][11][20][22][2][5][1]


For Safari International’s clients, the opportunity lies in using this pivot to build more resilient, diversified and digitally enabled trade architectures that connect East Africa’s commodity and manufacturing potential with East Asia’s capital, technology and demand. Firms that internalise the new rules of the game – dual compliance, multi‑currency settlement, cyber‑secure digital corridors and flexible route planning – will be better placed to navigate the volatility that will continue to define global trade through 2026 and beyond.[3][4]


a

[2] Japan, Britain to boost cybersecurity and critical minerals ... https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/japan-britain-boost-cybersecurity-critical-145844612.html

[3] SAFARI INTERNATIONAL TRADE & CONSULTANCY ... https://www.safariinternationaltrade.com

[4] About | Safari Internation 3 https://www.safariinternationaltrade.com/about

[6] China, UK to further deepen business relations https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202601/30/WS697ca15ea310d6866eb36ae5.html

[7] China to relax travel rules for British visitors, UK says https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c150yv75pn7o

[9] UK citizens to get 30 days visa-free travel to China https://www.smeweb.com/uk-citizens-to-get-30-days-visa-free-travel-to-china/

[10] Chinese whisky tariff cut to come into force on Monday https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4g54xzzze0o

[13] Scotch Whisky Tariffs Explained: China Cuts, India Opens ... https://thewhiskeywash.com/?p=128396

[17] Britain and Japanese Cybersecurity Strategy Strengthens https://thecyberexpress.com/britain-japanese-cybersecurity-cooperation/

[20] UK-Japan Industrial Strategy Partnership Update - GOV.UK https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-japan-industrial-strategy-partnership-update

[21] UK secures £7.5 billion Japanese investment in key growth ... https://ukcitiesinvestment.co.uk/uk-secures-7-5-billion-japanese-investment-in-key-growth-sectors/

[22] UK Secures $10 Billion Clean Energy Investment from Japan's ... https://esgnews.com/uk-secures-10-billion-clean-energy-investment-from-japans-sumitomo-corp/

[23] The UK-Japan Trade and Investment Relationship, Plus UK at ... https://goconnect.jp/2025/08/13/the-uk-japan-trade-and-investment-relationship-plus-uk-at-expo-update/

[24] London-Hong Kong RMB Forum: further development of offshore RMB market strengthened https://www.gov.uk/government/news/london-hong-kong-rmb-forum-further-development-of-offshore-rmb-market-strengthened

[26] China announces visa waiver for UK citizens | ITIJ https://www.itij.com/latest/news/china-announces-visa-waiver-uk-citizens

[27] UK – China Visa-Free Travel Rules 2026 https://www.davidsonmorris.com/uk-china-visa-free-travel-2026/

[28] UK and Japan sign investment partnership to drive economic growth https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-japan-sign-investment-partnership-to-drive-economic-growth

[29] [PDF] Joint press release by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of ... https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2025/09/20250930003/20250930003-ar2.pdf

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